Analyses are solely the work of the authors and have not been edited or endorsed by GLG.
Japanese companies better equipped than US European counterparts to whether the storm ?
October 20, 2008
Sumitomo Life Will Limit Overseas Investments on Currency Risk | www.bloomberg.com
Japanese top institutional investors asset allocation change justified by fundamentals. Domestic eqities allocation increase versus US or European equities to further support Yen implied volatility historic reversal ( as expected anyway).
October 3, 2008
Why Risk Models Failed to Spot the Credit Crisis by Adam Davidson | www.npr.org
The eyes of the world are focused on Washington where the SEC, the FED and Congress debate how they are going to execute the massive bail out announced last week. As a derivatives trader who sits in the trenches, I am more concerned about a larger issue. Where were the Risk Managers of these firms as they doubled down on exotic derivatives and traded credit default swaps as if they were shares of IBM? How in a world of endless quantitative models could we have ended up here in the midst of the largest credit crisis of all times? Washington would like us to believe the short sellers created this fiasco. Short sellers may have exasperated the present situation but the storm has been brewing for years. I strongly believe there has been a systematic failure in the area of Risk Management.
No Black Swans Here, just termites.
October 3, 2008
Why Risk Models Failed to Spot the Credit Crisis by Adam Davidson | www.npr.org
Programs run on information Information has value Unless purchased or forced, accurate, timely and complete information will not be disclosed Bad information, bad results
Blame the models and Risk Based Pricing
September 30, 2008
Why Risk Models Failed to Spot the Credit Crisis by Adam Davidson | www.npr.org
Models only cover certain variables and the crisis involved much more than mortgage pricing and a few macroeconomic issues. Risked based pricing as used in the mortgage industry had an underlying flaw that caused the models to fail. Greed played the other part.
September 29, 2008
Why Risk Models Failed to Spot the Credit Crisis by Adam Davidson | www.npr.org
Don't blame risk models for the financial crisis. The root cause was a failure of management. Risk management, as a discipline, did not fail -- it was never really tried.
AIG:How to Read the Roadmap to Avoid Disaster!
September 22, 2008
How AIG fell apart | www.reuters.com
What do some analysts opine was the real reason for AIG's debacle?What real lessons can be learned from this financial predicament?
Don't forget the Canadian Insurers
September 19, 2008
Japanese insurers seen eyeing AIG assets | www.reuters.com
Canadian life insurers are also well poised. Poor exposure is limited and managable. The strength of the Canadian vs. US dollar helps also.
Opportunity knocks for Japanese life and non life Insurers
September 18, 2008
Japanese insurers seen eyeing AIG assets | www.reuters.com
Alico Japan is indeed a superb business opportunity for Japanese life and non life insurers to expand market share at discount price. Lehman bankruptcy dammage assessment to Japanese life and non life insurers is limited.
The Global Financial Collapse - The Coming Revival? - Should We Expect More?
September 17, 2008
New York Allows AIG To Lend Itself Money | www.nytimes.com
The talk is as if Armageddon has arrived. A number of Institutions have collapsed or are looking for lifelines. The situation is bad but not alarming. Since September 2006 I have been arguing in these columns that the skyline was not bright and especially so since March 2007 - much against the considered wisdom. The present situation to my mind is one where most of those who had to collapse have done so. The time has come to pick up the pieces. The authorities should regulate without interfering with market forces. The situation is only bound to be brighter. I reason below the basis for my opinion.
Capitalistic Opportunity - The Ability to Buy-Out Corporate Pension Funds!
September 5, 2008
Buyouts boost as Pru takes £1bn C&W pensions | business.timesonline.co.uk
Implications: 1.Record breaking deal to off-load Pension Liabilities to Prudential Insurance Comapny: A Boost for the Cable & Wireless Company. Unload the Liability! 2.The LARGEST Transfer of Liabilities to an Insurer: The trend becomes more apparant. Keep the Assets and Transfer the Liabilities. End result: A better Balance Sheet and related ratios. 3.The causation - falling liabilities enhance the sale as the costs associated with the same delete or eliminate themselves. 4.A hugh amount of monies are on the table and approach E 1 billion in pension liabilities. 5.In return for the assumption of the liability- C & W infused E 10 million into the pipeline : a Material amount of money. 6.The original pension provider reduces it's liability by half, while the existing Trustees administer the Fund.
Battle for Dominance in Mortgage Fraud Analytics Space
October 17, 2009
A Second Article on Federal Chartering
October 13, 2009
Is an Optional Federal Charter for Insurance Companies in the Offing?
October 12, 2009
Where was my Risk Management at the time of the crime?
September 26, 2009
P&C Reinsurance Rates for the Renewals 2010
September 13, 2009