KC-X Contract – Size (And Infrastructure Cost) Matters

The draft KC-X tanker RFP has been out for a few weeks now – last time the USAF changed requirements during the selection process. No such chance this time around and no brownie points for being "bigger" either.

 

The much-vaunted and highly criticised concept of the last contest, including “more” no longer exists in this new draft RFP.

 

The USAF got away with ignoring the (significant) infrastructure costs the last go-around; it won't happen this time.

 

To that end, the larger A330 poses the biggest financial risk to the USAF decision making process.

 

The 767, while still larger than the existing KC-135, can still use the entire existing USAF network with zero-to-minimal modifications prior to potential service entry. The A330 would require a slew of maintenance hangars, fuel depots, logistics, support hardware to be altered to cater for the bigger airplane and increased staff numbers to support the fleet. Also, many air bases from which these tankers will operate to/from simply do not have the ground infrastructure in place to sustain movements of an A330. Pavement loading issues, taxiway size increases as well as longer runways will have to be paid for if the A330 gets the nod.

 

That’s before you consider that many of the existing KC-135s return to base with significant quantities of fuel still on board.

 

So is it worth filling up even more fuel on an A330 to have it come back after a few hours with a bigger proportion of fuel that hasn’t been offloaded?

 

You also then have to ask about storage of all that excess fuel. Most missions are fuel/weight centric – meaning that every pound or gallon of fuel is accounted for, so that post-flight, it does not pose a financial constraint by having to pay and construct more storage facilities for unused fuel.

 

Then there’s the acquisition aspect. The USAF does not want to pay out billions in advance for these modifications prior to delivery or during deliveries. In theatre, you need to be ready to go at first call – the A330 would not be able to provide that kind of availability in combat situations such as Afghanistan or Iraq where physical air base infrastructure is limited.

 

For the Boeing, they’ve identified all these requirements and aim to tailor their proposal around the needs of the air force, rather than going for something bigger, like the 777, for example.

 

It’s of no surprise that the 767 provides a better platform for Boeing to offer the USAF, not least because it has a working boom (Click).

 

Critically, the one aspect of infrastructure almost always overlooked is that of production facilities.

 

The 767 as a passenger airplane has had a phenomenal run - it has sold over 1,000 units with 57 remaining on order.

 

Its pioneered ETOPS flights, dragged Airbus into the 21st century kicking and screaming with their first true long haul twin engine jet in the A350XWB.

 

Boeing has a facility up and running to churn out tankers almost immediately.

 

Northrop Grumman-EADS/Airbus hasn’t even broken ground on their proposed facility in Mobile, AL.

 

The USAF will loathe absorbing these start-up costs levied via higher sticker prices per unit of tanker, which are inevitable – particularly when you factor in that the A330MRTT is almost two years behind delivery for the Royal Australian Air Force with less progress than even the 787 or A400M.

 

This on its own doesn’t suggest a win for Boeing by any stretch. What it does show, however, is that when crunch time comes, those who have thus far failed to factor in infrastructure as part of the lifecycle procurement costs of the KC-X tanker fleet should not be surprised if the A330 ends up as the losing candidate next summer.

 

No protest will change that either, because the fact remains the same – the A330 adds costs in so many aspects of the USAF’s operations that contesting a losing bid will be futile.