Bombardier Barbs Shows CSeries Can't Cut The Mustard

Airbus has been blighted with engineering woes, cost overruns and delivery schedule changes for the A380 and slow progress and funding/cost increase issues on the A350XWB, A330 tanker and A400M. Boeing has been stung to the tune of a few billion dollars on cost overruns on the 747-8 family, along with repeated delays of the 787 Dreamliner too.

That the CSeries has systematically failed to find support amongst current Airbus A320 or Boeing 737 operators is a big vindication of the widespread empirical evidence that supports the view that regional jet seating has risen over the last 50 years. Why else would Bombardier position the CSeries in the 100-seat and above bracket if that wasn’t the case?

The incremental improvements Airbus has had with the A320, coupled with the continual improvements and investor appeal of the 737 family, Bombardier has found that the market it is aiming for is no longer interested in a sub-130 seat airplane. Seat count has steadily been rising and there’s a reason why the A320 and 737-800 models in particular have humungous backlogs.

Economies of scale from a larger narrowbody far outweigh the Bombardier claims of superiority.

If anything, the verbatim offered by Bombardier chairman Laurent Beaudoin points to two fundamental failures. First is the failure to secure orders after over half a decade of marketing a family of jetliners that would supposedly “revolutionise” regional air travel. That hasn’t happened and isn’t going to happen. The customer base is ample evidence of that.

Secondly, and more importantly, is that the perceived economic and performance benefits of the CSeries are so horribly wrong that no major airline is naïve enough to switch their A320 or 737 orders for either CSeries 100 or CSeries 300 models.

In an age where fuel efficiency, volatility in oil prices and systemic yield attrition, you’d have thought that the CSeries would have stolen a march on the A320 and 737. If the Pratt & Whitney PurePower engine was everything it was made out to be, Airbus would have already launched a re-engined A320 after evaluating the type. But Airbus hasn’t yet done so – and that move alone underscores the problem with what the CSeries represents. The proposed technology suite on that family doesn’t meet or surpass the A320 or 737.

And if oil prices climb above $100-a barrel, airlines are more inclined to operate a smaller fleet of slightly bigger A320/737s than more, smaller CSeries-sized jets to focus on airport slot retention and increased frequencies and maximise utilisation (case in point, American Airlines and their phasing out of MD80’s). The CSeries family simply cannot offer let alone compete on that basis – airlines are only too aware of that, hence the reason the A320/737 backlogs are so large and much more robust.

Whenever Airbus and Boeing do eventually get around to replacing their narrowbody workhorses, the performance benefits, lower cost of operation and ease of maintenance will again push Bombardier and the CSeries out of the large jet arena for years to come.

The CSeries’ real rival is the Comac C919. Of course, there are questions as to whether the C919 will ever materialise as depicted – that aside, the CSeries has not made the impact Bombardier had hoped despite the (potentially illegal) Government aid it has had to launch it.

Shouting and raving about Boeing’s financial woes and the like doesn’t change the fact that Bombardier has thus far failed to convince anyone that the CSeries is a credible alternative to the A320 or 737.

If the Sukhoi Superjet 100 and the Embraer E195 cannot displace the A320 or 737, the CSeries has even less chance of that feat.