Mr. Martin Kamarck
Principal, MAKO Consulting LLC
Member of the Financial Services Council
Council Member Biography
Martin Kamarck is Principal of MAKO Consulting, providing strategic advice to clients. He is a director of Quadrant Structured Credit Products, a AAA-rated credit derivatives operating company owned by Magnetar Capital & Lehman Brothers. He recently completed longer-term retainer assignments for a European public company (offshore specialty reinsurance) and Booz Allen Hamilton (catastrophic risk). He has over 32 years of experience in law & business and public & private sectors, with expertise in credit risk management & structured credit. Mr. Kamarck held senior positions in the financial guaranty industry for over 13 years: as General Counsel & Co-Founder of the Structured Finance business at FGIC (Jan 1987 - Mar 1993); and as President of Radian's FG businesses (Apr 1999 - Jan 2006). Prior to Radian, Mr. Kamarck was the President and Chair of the US Ex-Im Bank. He began his career in law as a Partner with Morrison & Foerster, where he was chair of the East Coast business practice. (This is me - Update Profile)
Employment History
- 2006 - Unspecified
- Principal, MAKO Consulting LLC
- 1999 - 2006
- President, RADIAN GROUP INC.
- 1997 - 1999
- President, COO, AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.
- 1993 - 1997
- Chairman & President, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
- 1987 - 1993
- Managing Director, FINANCIAL GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY
- 1975 - 1986
- Partner/Chair East Coast Business Practice, MORRISON AND FOERSTER LLP
GLG NewsSM Analyses by Martin Kamarck(?)
Opinions and analyses expressed in GLG News are solely those of the author. See the Terms of Use for details.
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Beyond Credit Enhancement: The Value of Risk Management
March 9, 2009
Buffett Warns Insured Muni Bonds Could Be Next Shoe to Drop | www.tradingmarkets.com
The Bond Buyer headline: A default is a default, is a default, is a default. For bond issues most vulnerable to fiscal stresses, monoline insurers "write themselves into the indenture," with surveillance rights, reporting requirements and -- most imprtantly -- covenants and remedies more akin to an (old fashioned) bank loan than a bond issue. Especially with their portfolios of insured risks under stress, the monolines will aggressively exercise those rights as proxy for bondholders, so insured bondholders should be, generally, better protected. If, in his haste to cash in on the market opportunity in muni bond insurance, Buffett missed this basic element of the business, then BHAC's loss experience could be much worse than predicted.
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With the GSEs "Nationalized," Will There Still be a Market for Mortgage Insurance?
September 15, 2008
U.S. bails out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, ousts CEOs | www.bizjournals.com
The GSEs succeeded in supporting the creation of a broad, deep, liquid national market for mortgages. They used their market power to impose standardization on mortgage terms and underwriting. Thus was born the "conforming mortgage." Mortgage insurance is an artifact of this history. It is an inefficient and (at the individual whole loan level) unnecessary credit enhancement. But the rumors of MI's demise are premature. The last thing the new management of the GSEs want to do is spook the markets with sudden moves, loud noises or big changes. That said, there will be pressure to impose much more rigorous capital allocation/portfolio risk management controls. Politically, they can't reduce volume, per se, immediately at least, but the management of counterparty risk exposure to the MIs may well become more active. Bad news for weaker MIs. Later the survivors will again be caught between price competition and "innovation" (bad risk) in a smaller market.
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With the GSEs "Nationalized," Will There Still be a Market for Mortgage Insurance?
September 12, 2008
U.S. bails out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, ousts CEOs | www.bizjournals.com
The GSEs succeeded in supporting the creation of a broad, deep, liquid national market for mortgages. They used their market power to impose standardization on mortgage terms and underwriting. Thus was born the "conforming mortgage." Mortgage insurance is an artifact of this history. It is an inefficient and (at the individual whole loan level) unnecessary credit enhancement. But the rumors of MI's demise are premature. The last thing the new management of the GSEs want to do is spook the markets with sudden moves, loud noises or big changes. That said, there will be pressure to impose much more rigorous capital allocation/portfolio risk management controls. Politically, they can't reduce volume, per se, immediately at least, but the management of counterparty risk exposure to the MIs may well become more active. Bad news for weaker MIs. Later the survivors will again be caught between price competition and "innovation" (bad risk) in a smaller market.
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With the GSEs "Nationalized," Will There Still be a Market for Mortgage Insurance?
September 12, 2008
U.S. bails out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, ousts CEOs | www.bizjournals.com
The GSEs succeeded in supporting the creation of a broad, deep, liquid national market for mortgages. They used their market power to impose standardization on mortgage terms and underwriting. Thus was born the "conforming mortgage." Mortgage insurance is an artifact of this history. It is an inefficient and (at the individual whole loan level) unnecessary credit enhancement. But the rumors of MI's demise are premature. The last thing the new management of the GSEs want to do is spook the markets with sudden moves, loud noises or big changes. That said, there will be pressure to impose much more rigorous capital allocation/portfolio risk management controls. Politically, they can't reduce volume, per se, immediately at least, but the management of counterparty risk exposure to the MIs may well become more active. Bad news for weaker MIs. Later the survivors will again be caught between price competition and "innovation" (bad risk) in a smaller market.
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It's not how broadly you spread it; it's how deep.
February 28, 2008
Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit Test | www.nytimes.com
Lesson of monoline debacle: Core issue is concentration of counterparty risk.
Leading institutions connect with Martin Kamarck through GLG
GLG Study Groups with Martin Kamarck(?)
| Study Group Name | No. Members |
|---|---|
| Experts in the Leisure & Lodging Council | 4887 |
| Experts in the Automotive Council | 3422 |
| Structured Finance Experts | 382 |
| Research, Sales, and Trading Consultants (US) | 251 |
| Mortgage Servicing Experts | 219 |
GLG Live Meetings with Martin Kamarck(?)
Martin Kamarck has not participated in any GLG Live Meetings.